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In health economics, cost-effectiveness is defined as maximized health benefits for a given 
health budget. When there is a private alternative to public treatments, care must be taken 
when using costeffectiveness analysis to decide what types of treatments should be included 
in the public program. The correct benefit measure is in this case the sum of health benefits to 
those who would not be treated without the public alternative and the cost savings to those 
who would otherwise choose private treatment. In the socially optimal ranking of treatments 
to be included in the public health program, treatments should be given higher priority the 
higher are costs per treatment for a given ratio of gross heath benefits to costs. 
 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
What treatments should be included in a public health system? This is a
fundamental question in any country that has a public health system. As a
method to help answer this question, an obvious candidate is standard cost-
beneﬁt analysis. A very rough description of this method is the following:
One ﬁrst calculates the beneﬁts of a potential treatment, measured in money
units. These beneﬁts are then be compared with the costs of the treatment.
If beneﬁts exceed the costs, the treatment ought to be included in the public
health program.
M u c hc a nb es a i da b o u ts i m p l ec o s t - b e n e ﬁt analyses of the type sketched
above. In particular, many health economists have been sceptical to applying
traditional cost-beneﬁt analysis to the health sector. A main reason given
for this scepticism is that the analysis requires the calculation of a monetary
value of health beneﬁts. In particular, this means that one must put a money
value on life. Several health economists have been critical to this both for
ethical and computational reasons.
An alternative to traditional cost-beneﬁt analysis is so-called cost-eﬀectiveness
analysis.1 Cost-eﬀectiveness is deﬁned as the minimum cost for a given health
beneﬁt, or equivalently, maximal health beneﬁts for given expenditures on
health care. More precisely, one ranks all treatments according to the ra-
tios between health beneﬁts and costs, and treatments for which this ratio is
above some threshold should be included in the public health program. The
threshold is determined by the budget, which is assumed to be exogenously
given.2
Cost-eﬀectiveness analysis is not without problems. First, this type of
analysis does not give any guidance to the decision of how large the public
health budget should be, this decision is simply assumed to be exogenously
s e tb yt h ep o l i c y - m a k e r s .S e c o n d ,t ob ea b l et op e r f o r mac o s t - e ﬀectiveness
analysis, one needs an aggregate measure of health beneﬁts for each indi-
vidual. A typical measure that is used is QALYS, or Quality Adjusted Life
Years. It is well known in the literature that QALYs and most other aggre-
gate health indicators can only represent a person’s preference orderings over
1In the present article I use the term ”cost-eﬀectiveness analysis” in a broad sense that
also includes what some health economists call ”cost-utility analysis”. See Hurley (2000)
for a further discussion.
2F o raf u r t h e rd i s c u s s i o no fc o s t - e ﬀectiveness analysis see e.g. Weinstein and Stason
(1977), Johannesson and Weinstein (1993), Garber and Phelps (1997) and Garber (2000).
2life years and health quality of each life year in special cases.3 Finally, even
if one has a correct measure of aggregate health beneﬁts at the individual
level, it is not obvious that there is any justiﬁcation for taking a simple sum
over these beneﬁts over all persons for making a social evaluation.4
In the current paper all of the objections above concerning cost-eﬀectiveness
are ignored. Instead, the focus is on the consequence of a private alternative
to public treatment: In most of the literature that discusses how a public
health budget should be allocated across potential medical interventions, it
is explicitly or implicitly assumed that the health interventions that are not
funded by the public budget are not carried out. This may be a good as-
sumption for treatments such as heart surgery or cancer treatment. However,
for many treatments there is a private alternative to public treatment. The
private alternative may be potential in the sense that it is only relevant if
the treatment is not oﬀe r e db yt h ep u b l i cs y s t e m ,o ri tm a ye x i s ti np a r a l l e l
with the public alternative, e.g. due to waiting time for public treatment.
Examples of treatments that typically are oﬀered outside the public system,
at least if not oﬀered by the latter, are surgical sterilization, assisted fertil-
ization, cataract surgery and dental care. Comparing diﬀerent countries that
all have a predominantly public health system, one will ﬁnd that countries
diﬀer with respect to what is covered by the public system and what is not.
In the countries where a treatment of the above type is not oﬀered by the
public system, this treatment will typically be oﬀered by the private sector.
In standard cost-eﬀectiveness analysis, the health beneﬁts that enter the
calculation for a particular treatment is the health beneﬁtf o ra l lt h o s ew h o
get treatment in the public sector. However, this is a measure of gross health
beneﬁts, and does not measure the true health eﬀect of including a treatment
in the public program if part of the public treatment simply is a shift from
private to public treatment. To measure the true health eﬀect of including
a treatment in the public program one would have to calculate net health
beneﬁts, i.e. the net increase in total (private plus public) treatments as a
consequence of including the treatment in the public program. Intuitively,
one might expect hat the true beneﬁt measure in a cost-eﬀectiveness analysis
should be net health beneﬁts as described above. This is, however, not the
case. To see why not, consider the following simple example. There are two
3See e.g. Broome (1993), Mehrez and Gafni (1989), Culyer and Wagstaﬀ (1993), Ble-
ichrodt and Quiggin (1999) and Gafni et al. (1993).
4See e.g. Harris (1987), Wagstaﬀ (1991), Nord (1994), Olsen (1997) and Dolan (1998).
3treatments A and B with the same cost per treatment. If both are included
i nt h ep u b l i cp r o g r a m ,t h e r ew i l lb et h es a m en u m b e ro ft r e a t m e n t sf o rAa s
for B, so that total costs are the same for these two. Gross health beneﬁts
are higher for A than for B, and everyone would rather be without B than
without A. If only one of these two treatments are to be included in the
public program, it is therefore reasonable that this should be A. However,
this might not be the result of a cost-eﬀectiveness analysis using net health
beneﬁt s :I tm i g h tb et h ec a s et h a ti fBi sn o to ﬀered publicly, very few people
would choose B privately. The net health beneﬁts of B are therefore almost
as high as the gross beneﬁts. On the other hand, if A is not oﬀered publicly,
almost everyone might instead choose A privately, since A is valued higher
than B. The net health beneﬁts of A may therefore be very low, even though
the gross health beneﬁts are high. Ranked by the ratio between net health
beneﬁts and costs, B may therefore seem better than A.
From the discussion above, it is thus clear that neither gross nor net
health beneﬁts should be used in a cost-eﬀectiveness analysis when there is a
private alternative to public treatment. To ﬁnd out what the correct beneﬁt
measure is in this case, I us a simple model where maximizing the sum of some
aggregate measure of health beneﬁts for a given budget is socially optimal
(as deﬁned by standard welfare economics and given the budget constraint)
provided there is no alternative to public treatment. I then show that when a
private alternative to public treatment is introduced, the beneﬁt of including
a treatment in the public program is the sum of the net health beneﬁts and
the cost savings patients get from getting public instead of private treatment.
In order to add these two beneﬁt components one is thus forced to make a
monetary valuation of the net increase in health beneﬁts. The paper shows
that when this is correctly done, the social optimum (given the public health
budget) no longer implies that the public health system should maximize
gross or net health beneﬁts for the given public health budget. A comparison
is also given between the socially optimal priority ranking and the standard
cost-eﬀective ranking of diﬀerent treatments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic model
is introduced, and I derive the correct beneﬁt-cost ratio to be used in a cost-
eﬀectiveness analysis. Sections 3 and 4 point out some important diﬀerences
b e t w e e nt h ec a s e sw i t ha n dw i t h o u tap r ivate alternative. Some concluding
remarks are given in Section 5.
42C o s t - e ﬀectiveness with and without a pri-
vate alternative
There are n mutually exclusive potential illnesses, where each person gets
illness j with probability πj (formally, we let one of the ”illnesses” represent
perfect health, so that the probabilities add up to one). There are H persons
in the economy, and the utility loss of person h in the case of illness j is  h
j.
Illness j may be perfectly cured with a treatment that costs cj. The average





 j may be interpreted as the (average) health beneﬁt of giving treatment for
illness j. With this framework, traditional cost-eﬀectiveness analysis would
rank all treatments according to the ratios
 j
cj, and include in the public health
program all treatments for which this ratio between health beneﬁts to costs
exceeds some threshold. The threshold is determined by the exogenously
g i v e nh e a l t hb u d g e t .
Let the utility level of person h be u(yh)i ft h i sp e r s o ni st r e a t e df o r
any illness he/she gets, where yh is this person’s income. The function u is
assumed to be increasing and strictly concave. According to the notation
above, this person’s utility is u(yh) −  h
j if he/she gets illness j and is un-
treated. Assume that if the public health system doses not oﬀer treatment
for illness j, one can get private treatment at the price cj (i..e. the same
as the cost would be for public treatment). If treatment for illness j is not
oﬀered by the public heath system, person h thus has the choice between the
utility levels u(yh) −  h
j and u(yh − cj) if he/she gets illness j.
From the assumptions above, it follows that the expected utility of person



















At the level of the aggregate economy, πj is the proportion of the popu-
lation that gets illness j. The budget constraint of the public health system
is therefore given by X
i∈I
πiHci ≤ T (2)
where T is the exogenous budget. The cost Cj of including treatment j in
the public heath program is the increase in the left hand side of (2) such an
5inclusion gives, i.e.
Cj = πjHcj (3)
The beneﬁt Bj of including treatment j in the public heath program is the
increase in
P
h vh such an inclusion gives. Deﬁning Pj as the set of persons
that choose private treatment for illness j if this treatment is not oﬀered by





















The ﬁrst sum in this expression is the health beneﬁts of those who would
not be treated unless the treatment was oﬀered publicly. The second sum is
the cost savings of those who would choose and pay for private treatment if
the treatment was not oﬀered publicly.
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The set of persons that choose private treatment for illness j if this treat-
ment is not oﬀered by the public health system (Pj)i sg i v e nb yt h es e to f
persons that have a positive value of sh
















We wish to maximize
P
h vh subject to the budget constraint (2). The
solution to this problem is found by ranking all treatments according to the
beneﬁt-cost ratios
Bj
Cj, and including in the public health program treatments
in the order of declining ratios until the budget is exhausted. From the
equations above the ratios
Bj






















6If there were no private alternative, the term in square brackets in (7)
would simply be one, and we would be back to the standard cost eﬀectiveness




cj are important also for the case
when a private alternative exists. However, in this case there are other factors
than the ratios
 j
cj that matter in addition. With a private alternative the
term in square bracket is less than one, since sh
j > 0 for all those who choose
private treatment if treatment is not oﬀered by the public health system. We
therefore have the following important result: If there are treatments that for
some reason are not oﬀered by the private sector, such treatments should be
given higher priority as a candidate for inclusion in the public health program
than treatments that have the same ratio
 j
cj of gross health beneﬁts to costs
but are oﬀered by the private sector.
3 Size matters
Consider two illnesses/treatments j and k. In the absence of a private alter-
native, we know that j should be ranked higher than k if either  j is higher
than  k or cj is lower than ck. In both cases the beneﬁt-cost ratio is higher
for j than for k. When there is a private alternative to private treatment, it
is no longer obvious that this is true. Although the ratio
 j
cj is higher than
the ratio
 k




Ck, since the term
in brackets also will diﬀer between the two treatments. However, we show in
the Appendix that the beneﬁt-cost ratio deﬁned by (7) is in fact higher for
j than for k if either  h
j >  h
k for all h or if cj <c k. For treatments diﬀering
in this way, there is thus no diﬀerence between the present case and the case
of no private alternative. However, there is an important diﬀerence between
the two cases: When there is no private alternative, it is only the ratios
 j
cj
that matter for the ranking. When there is a private alternative, the term in
brackets in (7) is also of importance for the beneﬁt-cost ratio, and thus for
the ranking. In particular, consider the case where j and k have the same





there were no private alternative for any of these treatments, they would be
ranked equally in a cost-eﬀectiveness analysis, i.e. either both or none would
be oﬀered by the public system if cost-eﬀectiveness analysis was the criterion
used in the decision. When there is a private alternative this is no longer
7generally true. It is shown in the Appendix that the term in square brack-
ets in (7) is higher for higher costs per treatment for a given ratio between
gross health beneﬁts and treatment costs. This means that one can no longer
simply rank treatments by their beneﬁt-cost ratios, the cost per treatment is









cj, i.e. the treatment with the highest
cost per treatment gets the highest priority in the cost-eﬀectiveness ranking.
It may therefore be the case that the cost-eﬀectiveness analysis leads one to






The intuition behind the result that ”size matters” is as follows. Con-
sider a proportional increase in health beneﬁts and treatment costs. Even
if the money costs increase proportionally with the health beneﬁts, the util-
ity cost increases more than proportionally with the health beneﬁts, due to
the concavity of the utility function. Since health beneﬁts are measured in
utility units, costs rise more than proportionally with health beneﬁts when
both are measured in utility units. The private alternative therefore becomes
less attractive as health beneﬁts and treatment costs increase, which in turn
implies that public treatment should be given higher priority.
4 Heterogeneity matters
If there were no private alternative for any treatments, it would only be the
average health beneﬁt  j that would matter in a cost-eﬀectiveness analysis,
and not the distribution of  h
j across the population. This is no longer true
when there is a private alternative, since the term in square brackets in
(7) may depend on this distribution. The importance of heterogeneity is
analyzed in Hoel (2005) for the special case in which income is the same
for everyone. In particular, a comparison is given between two illnesses j
and k that have identical average health beneﬁts and treatment costs, i.e.
 j =  k =   and cj = ck = c. If preferences are more heterogeneous for k than
for j in the sense that the distribution of  h
k is a mean preserving spread of
the distribution of  h
j (in the terminology of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)),
treatment k should be given lower priority as a candidate for inclusion in the
public health program than treatment j. While this is an interesting result,
it is not valid as a general result for the case when income diﬀers across
8persons. To see this, consider the case of a two person economy, where only
one person (number 1) chooses to be treated privately if the treatments j






























The only diﬀerence between these two ratios is thus the terms s1
j and s1
k.
Since we are assuming that preferences are more heterogeneous for k than for
j,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t| 1
k− 2
k| > | 1
j − 2
j|. If y1 ≤ y2, it must be the case
that  1
k −  2
k and  1
j −  2
j are both positive, since it is person number 1 who
chooses private treatment although number 2 has at least as high income
as number 1. When  1
k −  2
k and  1
j −  2
j are both positive, it follows from
| 1
k − 2
k| > | 1
j − 2
j| that  1
k >  1
j, w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e ss1
k >s 1
j,s e e( 5 ) .F r o m




Cj, i.e. k is given lower priority than j.
However, from the reasoning above it is clear that if we instead had y1 >y 2,
we cannot exclude the possibility that  1
k − 2
k and  1
j − 2
j are both negative,
i.e. private treatment is chosen by the ”rich” person, and not by the person
who gets the largest utility loss in the absence of treatment. If  1
k −  2
k and
 1
j −  2
j are both negative, it follows from | 1
k −  2
k| > | 1
j −  2
j| that  1
k <  1
j,
which in turn implies s1
k <s 1




Cj in this case i.e. k is given higher priority than j. In this example
more heterogeneous thus leads to higher priority in the public system.
In the last example above there was a negative correlation between income
and utility loss in the case of illness. The case where these two variables are
uncorrelated is discussed in more detail in the Appendix. It is shown that
in this case the result derived in Hoel (2005) is valid: If preferences are more
heterogeneous for k than for j (as deﬁn e di nt h eA p p e n d i x ) ,k should be
given lower priority in the public system than j. The intuition for this result
is as follows: Treatment k has more health beneﬁts than treatment j for
persons with a large utility loss for both illnesses, but less health beneﬁts
than treatment j for the persons with a small utility loss for both illnesses.
9But the persons with a large utility loss for both illnesses are in any case
g o i n gt ob et r e a t e d ,s of o rt h e s et h eb e n e ﬁts of public treatment are their
cost savings, which are identical for k and j. Since the persons with a small
utility loss for both illnesses get less health beneﬁts from treatment k than
for j, k should be given lower priority.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The preceding analysis has shown that the existence of a private alterna-
tive has important consequences for the ranking of treatments in a cost-
eﬀectiveness analysis. An important resu l ti st h a tt r e a t m e n t st h a tf o rs o m e
reason are not oﬀered by the private sector should be given higher priority as
a candidate for inclusion in the public health program than treatments that
have the same ratio of average gross health beneﬁts to costs, but are oﬀered
by the private sector. A second important result is that for a given ratio
of average gross health beneﬁts to treatment costs, lower priority should be
given to a treatment the lower is the cost per treatment. Finally, the de-
gree of heterogeneity of preferences is of importance, but without knowledge
about the correlation between preferences and income we cannot say how the
ranking of treatments is aﬀected by this heterogeneity.
A Appendix: Proofs of results in Sections 3
and 4











j)( 1 0 )
Consider ﬁrst the case of cj = ck(= 1 for convenience) and  h
j >  h
k for all
h. From (10) it follows that











10Moreover, from (5) we have sh
k − sh
j =  h
k −  h









j =  
h
k −  
h
j (12)
where the inequality is strict if sh
k < 0a n dsh
j > 0 for at least one person.






βj − βk ≥  j −  k +  k −  j =0 ( 1 3 )
where the inequality is strict unless the same persons choose private treat-
ment for both illnesses j and k if they are not provided publicly (i.e. unless
sh
k and sh
j have the same sign for all persons). Higher gros health beneifts
thus leads to a higher ranking of the treatment.
Consider next the case of an illness for which (ignoring the subscript for

















From the concavity of the function u it follows that the fractions in the
square brackets are larger the larger is c. The whole terms in square brackets
a r et h u sl o w e rt h eh i g h e ri sc,s ot h a tβ is higher the higher is c. Higher
cost per treatment thus leads to a higher ranking of the treatment, for given
ratios between gross health beneﬁts and costs.
A partial increase in treatment costs can be considered as a combination
of a proportional increase in health beneﬁts and costs and a reduction in
health beneﬁts. It therefore follows from the results above that a treatment
should be given lower priority the higher are costs per treatment (for given
health beneﬁts).
Consider ﬁnally the consequences of preferences becoming more hetero-
geneous. Consider an illness for which (ignoring the subscript for notational




h σh =0a n dµ>0. The higher µ is, the more heterogeneous are people















11If there is no correlation between yh and σh, the average value of the σhs
for those who choose private treatment if treatment is not provided publicly
(i.e. those who have 1+µσh+u(yh−c)−u(yh) > 0) will be positive. For his
case an increase in µ will increase the terms in square brackets, i.e. reduce
β. In other words, the more heterogeneous the utility losses of an untreated
illness are, the lower priority should public treatment of this illness be given.
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